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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
)

SOUTHERN TITLE GUARANTY CO.,
INC., a Texas corporation,

)
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff-Appellant

)

v.

)

GLENN J. BETHERS and TELLA
MAE BETHERS, husband and wife,
Defendants-Respondents

)

Case No. 860311

:
)

The appellant responds to Point I of the respondents'
brief, which states that "the evidence does not clearly preponderate
against the trial court's finding and conclusion that defendants
were not unjustly enriched," as follows:
Throughout the respondents' brief they have raised for the
first time on appeal a number of issues which, needless to say,
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

The first of these

is the position that appellant cannot prevail on unjust enrichment
because the Bethers did not have knowledge of what their agent
was doing as far as individual lot releases, receipt of funds, etc.
They just simply sat back and collected the money as it rolled in.
There are two problems with this argument.

The first is that the

lack of knowledge by Bethers was never raised as a defense, does
not form a part of the findings by the court and does not constitute
in any way a basis for the court's judgment.

This point is raised

for the first time here, and it is raised repeatedly.

We submit

that this point of argument should be discarded and ignored by this
court.
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The second problem with this position is that the Bethers
are charged with the acts and knowledge of their agent.
is so basic that it should almost go without saying.

This point

"As a general

rule, where the relation of agency legally exists, the principal
will be liable to third persons for all acts committed by the
agent in his behalf in the course and within the actual or apparent
scope of his authority."
to say the least.

3 C.J.S. Agency, Sec. 390.

Hornbook law,

Bethers cannot claim the benefit of the agent's

actions, yet when something goes awry claim lack of knowledge of
every act of his agent as a defense.

Enough on this basic point.

The statement that "the determination of when and how the
proceeds from a Certificate of Deposit were to be paid to defendants
was made by Sunwest. . . " is completely in error.

The arrangement

between the parties on payoffs was controlled by the agreements
between the parties.

Not the arbitrary decisions of Sunwest.

Another point raised for the first time on appeal is the
allegation that "the only evidence presented to the Court as to
why Lot 1 was not released is that Valley Title determined, after
a meeting with one of the defendants and a representative from
Sunwest, to release Lot 5 rather than Lot 1. (Ex. 8.)"
brief p. 11.]

[Respondents'

This factual allegation is not found in the findings,

was not raised as an affirmative defense anywhere

in the

pleadings filed by the defendants, and the exhibit was not offered
for the purpose of raising this point. (Tr. 28)

The fact of the

matter is that Exhibit 8 was introduced solely to show that the
title company had written a reply letter wherein appellant's counsel
was informed by the title company that there was still a balance

-3-

owing. (Lines 3,4 and 5 of Tr. 28)

Thus, this point should be

ignored by this court, which point, I might add, is raised throughout
the defendants' brief.

Evidence to refute such a position was

available and this was known by defendants' counsel, which counsel
was a different attorney than the attorney preparing the brief of
the respondents.
Respondents argue that the testimony of Mr. Hall from the
title company was " . . . anything but convincing." (Respondents'
brief, p. 11)
of Mr. Hall.

We urge the court to examine closely the testimony
It is quite clear that he knew very well what was

going on, the procedures that were used, and the import of the
matters and evidence brought up and produced at the time of trial.
Quite to the contrary, Mr. Hall's testimony is quite cogent.
The defendants also argue that the money received

"...

was not earmarked nor specified as being related to any particular
lot."

(P. 12, Respondents' brief)

This statement is completely

contrary to the facts set forth in appellant's brief, and is
unsupported in respondents' brief by any reference to any supporting
evidence.

At the same point in respondents' brief it is also argued

that the money received was for the release of Lot 5.
evidence exists.

No such

It should be borne in mind that respondents did

not present any evidence of their own, and much of their brief is
an attempt to put on their case to try and refute the facts that
were before the court at the time it made its ruling.
should not be permitted to do.

This they
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On page 12 of the respondents1 brief it is argued that
"there was no net benefit conferred on defendants. * * * Finally,
it was not inequitable for defendants to retain the benefit, where
defendants received no more than that which Sunwest had contracted
to pay and the remaining balance due was equal to the release prices
for the remaining two lots."

We find subtly argued here an argument

made repeatedly by the defendants throughout these proceedings,
that being that the plaintiff is somehow obligated to show a net
increase to the defendants and to show where the error in accounting
lies.

This is grossly in error.

As we have argued in our initial

brief, all the plaintiff should have to show is that Lot 1 was paid
for by the prececessors in interest of the plaintiff's insured.
If we can show that Lot 1 was paid for, which we have done, then
that is the end of the issue.
the matter further.

Plaintiff is not obligated to pursue

Plaintiff is not obligated to see that the

defendants get something extra from the transaction, or point out
the source of the problem that has created the confusion in this
case.

Again, as stated, if the plaintiff can show that Lot 1 was

paid for, that the defendants received those funds, then those funds
are to be credited to that lot only, with the further resulting
entitlement on the part of the buyers, and their successors in
interest, to a clear fee title to that lot.

It is also necessary

to point out here that the allegation that the remaining balance
due was equal to the release prices for the remaining two lots
is totally without evidentiary support.

No accounting or other

evidence was produced by the defendants to support this position,
or any other position, for that matter.
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On page 13 of their brief, respondents state as follows:
"It may be that plaintiff and the parties who purchased
Lot 1, taken together, may have paid twice for Lot 1. It
may follow that someone was unjustly enriched through receipt
of those payments. That someone may have been Sunwest which,
in contrast to defendants, received a payment labeled as
being for Lot 1 and had knowledge concerning the chain of
events which plaintiff now claims shows that defendants
received a payoff for Lot 1. The evidence presented at trial
does not address these questions."
I don't know what trial counsel is referring to, but it is
certainly clear that at the trial of this matter these were the
very issues that were raised, and for Which evidence was produced.
This statement, too, would seem to be an implied admission that
Lot 1 was in fact paid for.

It is certainly clear that Sunwest

didn't retain the money because the evidence showed that the
CD purchased for Lot 1 was received by the title company, was
designated on the CD and on their records as having been received
for Lot 1, was later redeemed and the funds from that redemption
clearly and unequivocably traced to the Bethers, who cashed the
check and retained the funds.

These facts are clear and are totally

ignored by the defendants.
As to the respondents' point II, the following reply is made:
The respondents seem to argue that the claim of the plaintiff
is baseless because the money of the original purchasers was paid
to Sunwest and the title company.

So what?

The title company

was defendants' agent, Sunwest redeemed the CD in question and
paid those funds to Bethers.

The purchasers do not have to pay

the money directly to defendants for plaintiff to have a cause of
action.

They go on to argue that " . . . the money which was

-6-

ultimately received by defendants was not for the release of Lot
1 as far as the defendants were concerned." (Page 14, Respondents1
brief)

It doesn't matter what the concern of the defendants was

as long as the money paid was to be applied for the purchase of
a particular lot.

This is the nature of the transaction and the

funds are to be credited towards a lot designated by Sunwest.

The

funds are not to be credited however the defendants may wish.

In

addition, it is clear from Mr. Bethers testimony that he had no
idea what was going on with the money and to which lots monies were
to be applied.

The title company handled all of that.

The Bethers

didn't even maintain any records which showed for which lots
payments were being made.

How then can the defendants have any

opinion or concern on the matter?

They know nothing.

I might also

add at this point that this issue of defendants would seem to be
one concerning a new issue not presented in the case, not used as
a basis for the judgment, and raised for the first time here—again.
Defendants go on with the redundant argument on page 15
that "a second infirmity of plaintiff's argument is in its assumptior
that plaintiff acquired a right of action against defendants for a
release of Lot 1 by reason of being subrogated to the rights of the
purchasers of Lot 1."

This is a standing issue which was raised

by summary judgment in the court below and which issue was decided
in favor of the plaintiff.

A chain of title was clearly established

and the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action was ruled upon
by the court in favor of plaintiff.
raise that issue anew.

This argument is an attempt to

It should also be noted that this point did
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not form a basis of the lower court's judgment in favor of the
defendants which is the basis of this appeal.

The defendants

further argue that plaintiff has no right to maintain this action
because no payment was made directly to defendants by certain
undesignated parties, and Norman Anderson and his successors in
interest had no contract with the defendants.

First, as stated

above, they do not have to make the payment directly to the
defendants to have a claim against defendants for their wrongful
conduct.

That would be a pointless and empty act.

The only

consideration is whether or not the defendants received the monies
due for Lot 1.

The plaintiff isn't entitled to bring this action

only if Norman Anderson went to Glenn Bethers and paid him
personally for Lot 1.

All of these obtuse and tangential arguments

do nothing but attempt to obfuscate the real issues.
that the Bethers did receive the funds in question.
were paid to them by Sunwest.

The fact is
Those funds

That is all that matters.

I might

also add still again that this point does not form a basis of the
lower court's decision, and was never raised as a defense during
the course of the proceedings.
In addition, the Andersons and their successors in interest,
including this plaintiff, do have a contract with the defendants*
They have an unbroken chain of warranty deeds with their attendant
warranties.
On page 15 of the defendants brief they next argue that
plaintiff cannot maintain this action because of finding number 20
of the Findings of Fact (R. 192) , which states that "Sunwest II
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would not have been entitled to a reconveyance of Lot 1 on October
25, 19 84, without paying to the defendants at least the sum of
$9,563.38."

The court here is not addressing itself to the issue

of legal standing.

The court had already ruled plaintiff was

entitled to maintain its action (which ruling has not been appealed).
The court is simply finding that it doesn't believe the defendants
were paid twice of Lot 1.
Defendants next argue (page 15, Respondent's brief) the
incredible notion that "plaintiff's [sic] admitted at trial that
defendants had not received any more than what they were entitled
to receive under their contract with Sunwest, and that defendants
had not been unjustly enriched if the entire transaction between
Sunwest and defendants was viewed as a whole."

This peculiar and

grossly distorted interpretation of the case would cause one to
believe that the plaintiff at the trial admitted it didn't have a
case, but thought it would proceed in any event.

It is important

that we adhere to a realistic situation and not dabble in fantasy.
The plaintiff has never taken such a position, and has never made
any such admission.
The defendants go on to argue that plaintiff paid the money
with full knowledge of all of the facts and therefore cannot
obtain a refund of the money.
truth.

Nothing could be further from the

It is very clear that when the money was paid the plaintiff:

counsel and the plaintiff did not have a full knowledge of all
of the facts.

Indeed, the plaintiff relied upon facts supplied to

it by the defendants' agent to the effect that the monies owing
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for Lot 1 had never been received.

Based upon these representations,

and other assurances from defendants that the monies were still due,
the funds in question were paid in order to protect the interest
of plaintiff's insured in the subject property.

Contrary to what

the defendants argue, plaintiff does not waive its rights by not
first filing a lawsuit to determine if the money is due.

This

court has held that "a waiver is the intentional relinquishment of
a known right.

To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing

right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an
intention to relinquish it."

American Savings & Loan Assn. v.

Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292 445 P2d 1, 3 (1968).

None of these

elements are satisfied here, and defendants1 allegation is an
empty claim, unsupported by any evidence or any reference to the
record on appeal.

If plaintiff felt it had a reasonable basis

to believe that the payment for Lot 1 was still due, then it was
entitled to act upon that belief, and not be required to instigate
possibly needless litigation to protect its position in case it
was wrong, or to go fishing for a possible alternative fact situation.
This court has before admonished against the use of litigation for
fishing purposes. (See Shayne v. Stanely & Sons, Inc., 605 P2d 775,
Utah 1980.)

Further, it is quite obvious that the plaintiff did

not have full knowledge of all of the facts. (Even if it did, their
allegation is again unsupported by any reference to the record.)
It was not until later that it appeared that defendants had been
paid twice.

How defendants can conclude that plaintiff had all

of the facts at the time the payment was made is beyond the
understanding of the plaintiff.

Furthermore, it is interesting to
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note that any reasonable person in plaintiff's position, had that
person known all of the facts, had they known at the time the
payment was made what is now known, would never have made the
payment, and would have resisted in the courts any efforts on the
part of the defendants to foreclose their deed of trust.

It is

also important to keep in mind that the information upon which the
plaintiff relied was supplied by the defendants through their agent.
They cannot be allowed to provide false information, regardless of
the motive, or their best intentions, and then claim that plaintiff
cannot proceed against them because it should have known better.
It should also be noted in their point II that defendants
continue time and time again to claim ignorance of any of the goings
on as a defense to any and all claims, ignoring all the while
that it was defendants1 agent that was involved in the thick of
things, and for whose actions and knowledge the defendants are
chargeable.
As to defendant's point III, the following reply is made:
The whole issue of mistake is raised throughout the
proceedings below, beginning with the plaintiff's complaint filed
at the outset of these proceedings.
case.

Mistake is central to the whole

As this court stated in Mabey v. Kay Peterson Construction

Co., Utah, 682 P2d 287, 289 (1984),
11

[W] hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent they shall be treated in all
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.
Rule 15(b) [U.R.C.P.]; Poulsen v. Poulsen, Utah, 672 P2d
97 (1983); General Insurance Co. of America v. Carnicero
Dynasty Corp., Utah, 545 P2d 502 (1976); Holdaway v. Hall,
29 Utah 2d 77, 505 P2d 295 (1973)."
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Actually, under the facts of this case it would be virtually
impossible to deal with the case without discussing in detail the
issue of mistake.
As to point IV, it should not even be dignified by a reply,
except to say that had counsel paid attention to the nature of the
case he would see that this is a case revolving around the import
and effect of the facts, and the outcome is not dependent in any
significant degree upon legal issues to be supported by authorities.
CONCLUSIONS
This is a case that centers on whether or not sufficient
factual proof has been produced to show ahd prove that the
defendants in this action have been paid twice for Lot 1.

We

believe that the detailed presentation of the facts in our original
brief on appeal show that an unbroken chain in the delivery of
funds from the original purchaser—Norman Anderson—to the original
seller—the Bethers—existed.

Thus, when Norman Anderson paid

Sunwest at the closing for Lot 1, funds to release that lot from
the all encompassing deed of trust were paid to the Bethers, and
that when the CD was issued and delivered to the title company,
at which time the lot was to have been released per the agreement
with defendants but was not, Lot 1 was the lot designated by
Sunwest as the lot for which the CD was being deposited.
is that simple,

The case

When there is ample proof that Norman Anderson

paid for the lot, that a CD was purchased and deposited with the
title company, designating the CD to be for Lot 1, and when that
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very same CD was later redeemed and the funds from that CD
redemption then paid to the defendants, it is hard to imagine how
they can claim they haven't been paid for the lot.

Thus, when

the plaintiff, believing that the lot had not been paid for paid
the subject amount to the defendants, the lot was paid for a second
time.

Any other issues or points are beside the point, and that

includes all of this talk about substitute collateral.

Defendants

seem to feel that if plaintiff wants its money back it has to
substitute back in the same lot, other collateral to protect the
defendants.

Nonsense—literally.

If defendants have been paid

twice for the lot they are not entitled to the return of the lot
before they are obligated to return the duplicated purchase price.
At the trial these facts were argued to the court.

The

following dialogue ensued:
THE COURT:

Now, assuming that that is all true, and that

that's what that chain would establish, don't you still have to
prove that Mr. Bethers received something beyond what the contract
price required to be paid him for his property?

You're just

claiming unjust enrichment?
Mr. WALL: We're claiming unjust enrichment in that—and
it's in the Pretrial Order that in addition to having received
that amount for Lot 1, Southern Title now has also, because of the
mis-up, wherever it has occurred, has also paid him for Lot 1.
THE COURT:

Don't you have to show that the total payments

he has received have exceeded the amount that he was entitled to
under the contract?

Not just isolate it on Lot No. 1 and the
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way things came down on Lot 1?
MR. WALL:

I don't believe so, your Honor."

(Tr. 80)

Herein lies what we believe to be a key error in both the
reasoning of the court and that of the defendants.

Certainly if

we could show where the money had been wrongly credited, and/or
show that defendants had been paid more than they were entitled
on an overall basis, then plaintiff's case would be substantially
bolstered.

However, plaintiff has been unable to show where the

overall error lies, but plaintiff has been able to show that when
Lot 1 was paid for the credit didn't go to Lot 1.

If the agreement

between the parties had been such that monies paid didn't go to
particular lots, then defendants would have a point, but when the
terms of the agreement are such that when a particular lot is
paid for it is to be released and a reconveyance issued, then that
lot should be released and reconveyed, without regard or concern
for other problems between the parties.
that the court was wrong.
that it was paid for.

In this case we submit

That we can isolate Lot 1 only and show

If we can do that, and key to this case is

our position that we have shown that, then that lot should have
been reconveyed years ago when Norman Anderson bought the lot, and
any payments paid for that lot afterwards, such as that by the
plaintiff, become superfulous, and thus funds to which the
defendants are not entitled.
Also, if plaintiff were a party to the original contract,
as is Sunwest, and in the place of Sunwest, then how the payment
of plaintiff was to be credited, and whether or not defendants are
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entitled to retain those funds would be issues to be resolved
upon different grounds and from a different perspective.

However,

that is not the case here, and as a result we respectfully submit
that the decision of the district court was in error and the
plaintiff is entitled to a return of its monies.
DATED this y/Q^day of December, 1986.

Plaintiff-Appellant
Suite 800 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
521-8220
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